This is an author column. When Vladimir Putin says that the West is supposedly “preparing for war with us,” I think it is important not to argue with the emotion of fear, but to restore the chain of cause and effect. Europe is indeed preparing for the worst-case scenario. But not because it wants a war with Russia. It is doing so because the Kremlin has already shown that it can start wars and then call them self-defense.
What happened
On June 23, Putin told graduates of Russian military academies that NATO and EU countries are increasing military budgets and justifying this with the “Russian threat.” In his version, everything is turned upside down in the familiar way: Russia is first presented as being forced to defend itself, and then the West is accused of using that as a pretext for militarization.
Against this background, European concern looks less like propaganda and more like a response to reality. Nordic and Baltic media, citing military and intelligence assessments, have reported Russian military construction near NATO borders and a potentially dangerous window in the coming years. At the same time, their sources are careful: this is not proof that the Kremlin has decided to attack tomorrow, but it is evidence of capabilities being prepared and of escalation risks.
Against this backdrop, Europe is increasingly drawing a simple conclusion: the continent’s security cannot be postponed. That is why Germany is deploying a brigade in Lithuania, Latvia is building anti-tank obstacles, the Baltic states are learning how to fight drones, and European defense companies are increasingly turning to Ukrainian battlefield experience.
Why it matters
The Kremlin’s logic rests on substitution: if a neighbor installs a lock after someone has already broken into his house, he is accused of aggression. But Europe’s defensive preparations did not come from nowhere. They came after Crimea, after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, after missile strikes, nuclear blackmail, sabotage, and threats toward Poland, the Baltic states and Moldova.
Yes, Europe is rearming. Yes, it is again talking about conscription, factories, missiles, air defense and fortified borders. But defense after an attack is not the same as preparation for an attack. It is an attempt to make sure Putin is not tempted to test NATO’s resilience when Russia rebuilds strength or when Washington once again starts bargaining with the security of its allies.
Ukraine is especially important here. Ukrainians have paid a terrible price for Europe to see what modern war looks like: drones, electronic warfare, mobile air defense, digital command systems, attrition and constant adaptation. If Europe is learning from Ukraine, that is not preparation to conquer Russia. It is an attempt not to become the next victim of the same logic of force.
My conclusion
I find it dangerous when Russians are once again sold the image of a besieged fortress. That image is needed not to keep people safe, but to make it easier to justify new spending, new bans, new mobilization and the state’s renewed readiness to dispose of other people’s lives.
The real threat to Russia today is not that Europe is building defenses. The real threat is that the Kremlin has turned war into its main political instrument. As long as that remains true, neighbors will strengthen their borders, armies will prepare for the worst, and ordinary people will live under the shadow of a growing fear of a larger war.
My position is simple: there must be no war between Russia and Europe. And the best way to prevent it is not to repeat Putin’s story about an external enemy, but to stop the war against Ukraine and return politics to where it belongs: responsibility, negotiations and respect for other people’s borders.